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INTRODUCrION
Are there boundaries to the economic model of the structure of
corporate law? If so, where do they begin?
Much scholarship in this Symposium deepens the model of cor-
porate law as a three-player contract among shareholders, managers,
and the board. It is a model that Frank Easterbrook and Daniel
Fischel used ten years ago here at The University of Chicago Law
School in their book, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law,
which culminated and accumulated their work on the contractarian
model of the corporate law.' Corporate law is-or in its normative
version should be-a contractarian arrangement between and among
managers, the board, and shareholders. Corporate law should be a set
of default rules among these players, as the most likely rules the play-
ers would adopt, or as the rules that would be the easiest to contract
t David Berg Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.
I Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law
(Harvard 1991).
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away from (if the parties did not want them). Fiduciary duties in this
model represent the ex ante contract that managers and shareholders
would have reached. Corporate law and corporate law judges referee,
in this view, that three-player game. Corporate structure results from
players adapting their corporate institutions and decisionmaking to
the economic task at hand.2
In its positive form, the contractarian perspective saw Delaware
as coming close to the economic model, with most of Delaware corpo-
rate law (except probably for takeover barriers) conforming to the
model. The Symposium articles fit this tradition. So the existence of
barriers to takeover tell some that the resulting increase in managerial
agency costs would drive up managerial compensation,3 while it tells
others that the higher agency costs increase the demand for other
tools (such as more incentive-based compensation and more board
independence), tools that would constrain these higher agency costs.4
Or it could tell others that the economic model could be better ap-
plied if the board had less authority to decide on a takeover and
shareholders had more.5 Or it could tell others that the three-player
contract might be readjusted by giving the board yet more authority-
via three-year terms-subject to a "campaign financing" law that
would have the company pay the expenses for (some) shareholder-
initiated proxy fights: more security for managers in the short run,
with lowered costs to shareholders who challenge managers in the
6
medium run.
These views let us know that there is more to be said-and de-
bated-on how best to implement the economic model of corporate
law, a model that focuses on the three-player game of allocating deci-
sionmaking authority among managers, the board, and shareholders. It
is the model that has dominated corporate law scholarship and that
continues to dominate it. And it is a good model for us in the United
2 The corporation is, in this view, a more complicated contract, one that contracts with
suppliers, employees, and so on; but corporate law focuses on the three-player contract.
3 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Jesse M. Fried, and David I. Walker, Managerial Power and
Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U Chi L Rev 751 (2002).
4 See Marcel Kahan and Edward B. Rock, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the
PilL'Adaptive Responses to Takeover Law, 69 U Chi L Rev 873 (2002).
5 See Lucian Bebchuk, The Case Against Board Veto in Corporate Takeovers, 69 U Chi L
Rev 973 (2002). Similarly, Victor Brudney and Allen Ferrell would apply an economic model to
reallocate the power to make charitable gifts from managers to shareholders. See Victor Brud-
ney and Allen Ferrell, Corporate Charitable Giving, 69 U Chi L Rev 1191 (2002). And Dan
ischel argues that the judges should resolve corporate disputes by using stock market prices,
sometimes reconstructed, whenever possible. Daniel Fischel, Market Evidence in Corporate Law,
69 U Chi L Rev 941 (2002).
6 See William T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs, and Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Great Takeover Debate:A
Meditation on Bridging the Conceptual Divide, 69 U Chi L Rev 1067 (2002).
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States because the constraints that the articles impose on the model
are attenuated, weak, and unimportant here.
But to see why the model works so well, we should look for its
boundaries; and the Symposium articles show us where we should be
exploring if we wanted to find those boundaries. That is, can we trace
the lines in the articles to discern the boundaries of that contractarian
model? Is there a limit, where other factors outside of the three-player
contractarian model kick in, factors that we would have to understand
if we were to explain the corporation well?
There is such a limit, and if we look at the bigger picture that the
Articles sketch out, we can catch glimmers of how culture could limit
the economic model. So here, I use the articles from this Symposium
to sketch out an outer limit, a boundary, to the economic model, where
that model starts to do less well as a positive matter in explaining what
institutions we see and which ones are effective (and where those of
us who think as a normative matter that the economic model in the
end usually best maximizes welfare might seek to roll back these lim-
its even farther).
In Part I of these Remarks, I trace out the economic model of how
takeovers, if impeded, should induce substitute institutions that keep
the corporate pie from diminishing too much in size, but that divide up
that corporate pie differently. In Part II, I sketch out how culture, such
as attitudes toward wealth, can facilitate or retard that Coasean re-
structuring; almost automatic in the United States, that new division of
the pie still would encounter resistance elsewhere. Culture can vary the
costliness of substitutes in the economic model. And by varying costs,
culture can vary the efficacy of the substitutes. Culture could limit this
Coasean restructuring, but in the United States, it does not.
In Part IlI, I expand this notion of cultural boundaries: even basic
corporate law characteristics, such the efficacy of controls on inter-
ested party transactions, could be a function not just of finance, eco-
nomic rationality, and institutional capacity, but also of cultural back-
ground. Identical institutions could produce widely varying results if
we vary just one cultural consideration: varying attitudes toward
wealth can vastly vary the efficacy of these institutions, the ease of
ownership separation, and whether the Berle-Means firm will domi-
nate an economy or be a minor, secondary business institution.
In Part IV, I look at the interaction between culture and econom-
ics, how and when economics dominates culture, and how and when
each is independent. In Part V, I trace out two political limits to the
economic model-one known and one revealed in the Symposium-
of how legislative politics and judicial sympathies can cap and limit
the economic model.
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I. THE ECONOMIC MODEL WITHOUT LIMIT
A. Antitakeover Law Pressure on the Three-Party Bargain
Let us start with the perspective that takeovers reduce manage-
rial agency costs to shareholders. It is the usual perspective but not a
unanimous one. But let us pass on that debate here. And let us posit
that we operate in the "space" where product, capital, and labor mar-
ket competition do not fully constrain the managers to work for share-
holders. (No need to sketch out limits to these markets: We all know
those limits exist, although opinions differ as to where the line is.) In
that "space," we posit, takeovers make managers work for sharehold-
ers.
But then antitakeover structures (such as poison pills), legislation,
and court decisions (which the legislature does not overturn) impede
takeovers. (One limit to an economic model might be right here. Why
do courts constrain takeovers, and why do legislatures let those deci-
sions stand or add to the barriers? Three-party efficiency might be an
answer. But the shape of the corporation is partly determined by why
the polity validates antitakeover mechanisms, such as the pill. It is not
economically foreordained-more on that below.)
So antitakeover structures make managers less loyal to share-
holders. Managerial agency costs rise, so the demand for takeovers
persists and, indeed, increases. If managerial agency costs rise, players
would then pay "more" for takeovers.
B. The Coasean Bargain Redone
In Marcel Kahan and Edward Rock's model, with the gates open
for high compensation, we see an institution that "buys" managers off
from opposing takeovers. True, managers can now "just say no" (most
of the time). But money can change their minds. It would be awk-
7 Compare Moran v Household International, Inc, 500 A2d 1346 (Del 1985) (holding that
the directors' poison pill defense was within the business judgment rule), with Smith v Van
Gorkom, 488 A2d 858 (Del 1985) (holding that the business judgment rule did not protect deci-
sions by directors who were not reasonably informed). The former validated the poison pill and
was upheld. The latter lambasted directors and was effectively repealed. See 8 Del Code Ann
§ 102(b)(7) (1991 & Supp 1993) (permitting corporations to eliminate personal liability of direc-
tors for breach of duty of care).
8 So it is logically possible that Bebchuk, 69 U Chi L Rev 973 (cited in note 5) (arguing
that it is preferable to give boards less veto power over takeovers), sketches out the appropriate
economic model but that politics trumps it. Or, via Coase, there are several possible models, and
the political muscle of managers determines which one of the plausible models wins out. Indeed,
this might constitute one of the boundaries to economic analysis. And managers may win more
often or more easily if they have political allies. Is the result wealth-maximizing or do managers
win because they "have the votes"? One answer is that legislatures listen to managers, especially
when the bystanders (employees, consumers, average citizens) are wary of hostile takeovers. Let
us put this potential limit aside for now, although it potentially cabins the pure economic model.
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ward-and visibly in violation of corporate law duties-if the offering
company directly presented managers a check for $20 million on con-
dition that those managers drop their opposition to a hostile bid and
managers cashed that check. But if there are preexisting options in
place with a value of $20 million if the takeover vests, then the man-
agers see the personal value to them of the bid going forward. And
then they often acquiesce.
The economic model, in a first cut at the issue, is vindicated.
Managers have a "property" right to resist takeovers, but in a Coasean
bargain-indirect, to be sure, and perhaps not the perfect way for the
three parties to do these things-the managers get paid to give up
their property right. If the value and efficiency of the transaction is
large enough, it goes forward, as it would have before the antitakeover
laws, devices, and decisions arose, but managers get a bigger piece of
the pie than they did before.
One need not evaluate here whether the increased managerial
compensation is "incentive" compensation or "rent extraction."9 The
check could be seen as tribute to powerful managers, who extract
value from the firm, or it could be seen as a payment contingent on
takeover, thereby aligning managerial incentives with shareholder
value. All we need to know at first is that it is high enough to induce
managers to accede to what would otherwise be a hostile takeover.'°
The takeover-induced pie is, we can believe, about the same in size,
but its division changes. (We pass over how much this Coasean rebar-
gain re-creates the incentives ex ante: Some takeovers do not go for-
ward even with the option-vesting "pay-off" because managers resist
or the offeror withdraws a takeover offer that the increased compen-
sation made more costly." And takeovers' incentive effects on manag-
ers are reduced by the antitakeover institutional structure, because
managers know that a takeover will put them out of a job but will pay
them handsomely, so there is less for them to fear ex ante, when run-
ning the firm. Yet they presumably compete more heavily for that big
piece of the pie that the CEO can extract. How it all sorts out-more
efficient overall, less efficient overall, or a change in orientation-is
not fully clear in the model. The reequilibration possibly is not the
best way for the players to handle corporate control transfers, but is
9 Compare Kevin J. Murphy, Explaining Executive Compensation: Managerial Power ver-
sus the Perceived Cost of Stock Options, 69 U Chi L Rev 847 (2002) (arguing that increased
managerial compensation is based on incentives), with Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker, 69 U Chi L
Rev 751 (cited in note 3) (arguing that increased managerial compensation is due to rent-
extraction by managers).
10 Or, managers are in fact getting incentive compensation. The incentive, though is not
day-to-day compensation, but an incentive to sell the firm to the highest bidder.
11 See Reinier Kraakman, The Best ofAll Possible Worlds (or Pretty Darn Close), 69 U Chi
L Rev 933 (2002).
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just a second or third best. But the point that we get some substitution
effect, and possibly a large substitution effect - Kahan and Rock's ba-
sic point--is well taken. We will stick with it.)' 2
Thus sketched out, we see the economic model in action. The rule
changes, and there is a Coasean reequilibration.'3 (The only "bound-
Airy" to the economic model thus far is the question of why managers
win so often in getting antitakeover decisions legislation, the question
we have put aside. But once we take that political boundary as
"given," as exogenous, the maximizing economic model is back in
play.) If the substitute is close enough, Coase once again shows us
how parties can contract around the rules to make the result effi-
cient-conceivably as efficient as where we started.
That's enough. And we could stop there. But...
II. CULTURAL LIMITS TO THE ECONOMIC MODEL?
Not so fast. Imagine that costs afflict the substitute. If the substi-
tutes were highly costly-for some firms or in varying degrees for all
firms-then a Coasean reequilibration would be harder. Large, mana-
gerial-run firms would be less subject to takeover, and probably run
less well. Some, maybe many, larger managerial-run firms would be
less effective and in time out-competed by smaller ones.
The substitute here for the pure hostile takeover is the quasi-
friendly offer with vesting of heavy stock options that buy off manag-
ers from their opposition. No other substitute, remember, works as
well (we have assumed), and this substitute, even if imperfect, is pretty
good.
But what if there were costs-big costs-to the substitute?
12 And for this parenthetical reason, Kahan and Rock's optimistic variation-with com-
pensation perfectly offsetting the pill-seems possible, but only if serendipity reigns. See Kahan
and Rock, 69 U Chi L Rev 871 (cited in note 4). The question would be how big a loss the three
players suffer-that is, how imperfect the compensation substitute is. A reservation here is that
the new equilibrium, even one with an identical number of takeovers, could be-indeed, should
be, theoretically-at a lower level of shareholder welfare. But this reservation does not implicate
their main claim that there are substitutes, however imperfect.
13 This contractarian argument could partially explain the lull in takeovers at the very end
of the 1980s and in the early 1990s. Paramount's approximation of a "just say no" defense for
boards maybe really did shut down takeovers. See Paramount Communications; Inc v Ttme Inc,
571 A2d 1140 (Del 1989). But then it took a few years for option mechanisms to kick in to
weaken managers' determination to resist takeovers.
14 Note the comparative effect: indirect compensation buys managers off from opposing
takeovers. As such, comparing takeover law among heterogeneous jurisdictions would thus not
predict takeover incidence. That is, law could be the same across countries, or the same in a single
country across time, but if compensatory side payments let managers get bought out, takeovers
happen. If side payments do not work, takeovers do not happen. Rules could be the same, but if
compensatory norms vary, takeover results differ.
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I am going to modulate the quality of this substitute with culture,
with a preference extracted from the Symposium articles. When we do,
everything changes.
Suppose that the new institutional arrangement induces organiza-
tional degradation in many firms (by, say, demoralizing enough em-
ployees in an important way), but the original arrangement did not.
This is of course purely academic: according to the Kahan-Rock
analysis-and this is plausible-Americans are not allergic to the sub-
stitute. CEOs get hyperpay, and the incidence of takeovers stays about
the same, they suggest, without any other big cost to the economy.
But let us think about culture. And let us think about how cul-
tural traits-or at least one trait-could differ from that which we
have. That is, we know that in some general way culture affects what
we do, but the usual perspective of culture is so wide, so general, and
so thin that its analytic impact is correspondingly low. So let us take
one cultural trait, and only one-attitudes to wealth-vary it, and see
how varying it could affect the micro-institutions of the public firm.
When we do, as I said, everything changes.
A. As Affecting the Quality of Institutional Substitutes
Where is that one cultural assumption that makes the Coasean
model work so nicely? Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker analyze CEO pay,
concluding that the internal checks do not constrain CEO pay. Rather,
they say, an "outrage" constraint caps pay. At some point the press, or
the directors' sense of what is right, kicks in and prevents pay from go-
ing higher.s
That outrage constraint is staggeringly high in the United States.
Indeed, Kevin Murphy says that the American outrage constraint is so
high that it probably has not yet been reached and probably does not
yet much constrain executive pay.16 Lots of money can go into mana-
gerial hands before directors, or the press, are outraged. Hence, be-
cause it is staggeringly high, there is plenty of room for the Kahan-
Rock Coasean buy-out mechanism to work its magic. The firm can re-
equilibrate. The only question is whether the new substitute arrange-
ments are just about as good as the old ones.
But where does that potential for outrage come from? And what
if the outrage constraint were not staggeringly high but staggeringly
low? Consider the possibility that the board's directors could not pos-
sibly allow, say, more than $500,000 in bonuses in any one year. No
human being should make more money than that, they think. And fur-
ther, imagine that the vesting of (a mere) $500,000 in stock options is
15 See Bebchuk, Fried and Walker, 69 U Chi L Rev at 786-88 (cited in note 3).
16 See Murphy, 60 U Chi L Rev at 855-57 (cited in note 9).
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not enough to induce managers to accept the takeover bid. Then the
target firm managers do not acquiesce in the bid, and since takeover
law gives them the trump cards to resist a hostile bid, they defeat
(most) hostile bids.
The consequence: higher managerial agency costs, fewer bids. The
players might search for other substitutes (even better boards, say),
but by hypothesis we do not have any other perfect or near-perfect
substitutes. We will get an equilibrium eventually-maybe smaller
firms, for example, with denser contracting relations among them-
but it will not be the same equilibrium we see here.
B. As Degrading the Organization
"Outrage" could link up to the firm's microstructure. It might not
just be the directors' internal sense of rightness and outrage, the
mechanism that Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker posit. What if the firm's
employees would be demoralized, or up in arms, if the CEO got $20
million in a bonus or in exercisable stock options?
Then directors would have a problem: yes, they could buy off the
CEO (into takeover acquiescence) via high compensation and thereby
restrain managerial agency costs (or reduce their negative conse-
quences), but to do so would demean the organization.'7 Hence, some
directors would not take the substitute, because the firm's organiza-
tional structure is allergic to that new strain of compensation. Those
firms would be immune from takeovers. And hence, those firms' man-
agers would be more entrenched, and managerial agency costs higher
in that set of firms.
And, hence, we have just traced out a cultural limit to the eco-
nomic model. Yes, we get a new equilibrium in the division of author-
ity among the three players as takeover law becomes pro-manager
and validates (nearly) a "just say no" defense, but the quality of that
equilibrium is determined in part by culture: the size of the internal
outrage and organizational degradation that high executive pay in-
duces is the cultural variable. And if culture made high pay highly
costly to the organization, then the recalibration of authority would
yield a less productive firm.
In the United States that cultural cost is nil or nearly so. But in
other imaginable cultures, the result would differ. The American re-
equilibration is plausible in the Kahan and Rock model because any
American cultural constraint on pay is far out, hardly constraining at
all.
17 See Saul Levrnore, Puzzling Stock Options and Compensation Norms, 149 U Pa L Rev
1901,1917,1919 (2001).
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And hence, far off on the horizon, we glimpse a potential cultural
constraint to the economic model.
C. As Reconfiguring a Persisting Economic Model
We could absorb this cultural limit into the economic model by
saying that culture is just an exogenous constraint. This move works
logically, but the model is uninteresting if every time a maneuver
worked badly for maximization we just dubbed the constraint an ex-
ogenous limit.
It would be better to look at culture here as primarily outside the
American corporate model. Part of that boundary of outrage is demar-
cated by where compensation (in size and type) demeans the quality of
the organization. At some point, it is not just a general outrage that is
in play in, say, the press, the boardroom, public opinion, or the CEO's
own conscience, but outrage among the employees on the shop floor or
in middle managers looking at their computer screens. If enough peo-
ple in the organization are outraged, that outrage can demean organ-
izational cohesiveness and, eventually, the firm's performance and its
stock price. One might understand the beginning of outrage to be co-
terminous with the beginning of organizational degradation.
In one sense, perhaps boards (and senior managers) would oper-
ate in the stockholders' interests even here, eventually. Managers-to
the extent they are unconstrained-end up with the highest compen-
sation possible, until the level and type of compensation degrades the
firm. One might see this as putting an outside, board-based boundary
on managerial acquisitiveness, or one might see this as solely limited
by the senior managers' own calculations: at some point they cannot
get more because for them to take more would kill the golden goose.
As compensation approaches that boundary, the organization be-
gins to degrade. That degradation feeds back into the value of the
stock the senior managers have, thereby limiting managers. It also di-
minishes managers' utility otherwise: they would preside over a dete-
riorating organization, which would diminish their sense of self, their
happiness, and so forth. In the United States that boundary is so very
far out in the compensation spectrum that the trade-off hardly hap-
pens; in other nations it is much closer. Hence, a high level of pay and
pay highly sensitive to general stock market performance induce less
outrage in the United States than one could imagine, and less outrage
than it would create elsewhere.
If these cultural restraints were in play, that would not end eco-
nomic adaptation. The players would seek to upgrade other substi-
tutes (such as better boards) or fight harder for different rules. But by
hypothesis, these are highly imperfect (actually nonexistent, in the
simple model we started with). Shareholders might try even harder to
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roll-back antitakeover rules, overturn Paramount Communications,
Inc v Time Inc,"' and so forth. They might win, they might lose, but
whether they win or lose would depend as much on their political
power as the efficiency of the three-player bargain. As Kahan and
Rock tell us, the shareholders tried to roll back the rules, but they
failed. They might have succeeded if they tried again and harder. But
they still might have failed.
Or (and this could be important) the nature of the firm might
change in a way Coase described long ago, not in the social cost article
but in the nature of the firm inquiry:'9 If cultural constraints impeded
takeovers, and if substitutes were unavailable, managerial agency
costs-a type of transaction cost -would rise. And, as Coase told us, if
the transaction costs inside the large firm rise, and that rise made the
large firm more costly relative to smaller firms, we would get a new
firm-versus-market tradeoff. We would get more small firms, perhaps
with denser relational contracts among them, and fewer very large
firms.
And thus the economic model, of a three-player bargain that is
easy to remake as rules change, works as long as culture does not seri-
ously constrain the substitute. That is, as long as the "outrage con-
straint" is high enough to allow stock-based compensation that
changes CEO resistance'to a hostile takeover. But culture might con-
strain the substitute. If it does, all bets are off.
And if it does, and if the other substitutes are functionally imper-
fect, we have just mapped out a cultural boundary to the economic
model.
D. As Distant in the United States, and Closer-in Abroad
We can make this more real. I once was looking for the mechan-
ics of incentive compensation in Europe, looking in part at tax rules
that constrain heavy use of incentive compensation in French public
companies. In a conversation with a Paris-based compensation con-
sultant, I asked how the French tax rules worked. Indeed, the tax rules
were not generally as favorable as the American rules to the firm and
the incentivized managers.
But then the consultant went on. He next complained about
Americans (such as myself) who looked at the rules and the numbers,
trying to find the incentive effects from the tax rules, an effort reveal-
18 571 A2d 1140 (Del 1989).
19 R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm (1937), in Oliver E. Williamson and Sidney G. Win-
ter, eds, The Nature of the Firm: Origins, Evolution, and Development 18, 23 (Oxford 1991) (argu-
ing that firms get larger until the costs of organizing the next transaction within the firm equals
the costs of using the open market).
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hig, he said, that we did not really understand the French company. A
more basic reason explained why high incentive compensation had
not yet, as of then, worked well for many French firms. The average
French person, he said, hates the rich. Hate, he said. Not envy, as I
might say would be the dominant American parallel trait. Not admira-
tion, as might lace some of American culture.
There are analogous sentiments in those other cultures: A legen-
dary European manager (Percy Barnevik) just retired, as I am writing,
with a multimillion dollar retirement benefit, a benefit that induced
widespread disgust, with the "Swedish prime minister ... saying he
was 'distressed' over the size of [the] pension" and with a Swedish
economist (not a sociologist) saying: "He has fallen from grace ...
Sweden is unforgiving when it comes to greed. ' 'n And the reaction has
historically been a general one, not one tied to a specific person or a
single financial event:
Some countries-notably Germany, Spain, Belgium and Swe-
den-simply haven't caught on to the stock-options trends yet [in
1998], either because tax laws penalize them, or options aren't
considered entirely ethical .... The idea of a corporate official
having access to millions of dollars of his group's stock appeared
21antithetical to Sweden's egalitarian tradition.
That lack of "ethics" could be manifold: because the incentive pay
demeaned the managers, who should be professionals and not be ex-
plicitly motivated by money, or who should do a professional job and
then receive an honorarium, or because the incentive pay "unethi-
cally" made managers into "mere" agents of shareholders instead of
professionals who stood above the fray in running the corporation.
Whatever the reason, the price of the Coasean rebargain is made that
much higher by the cultural constraint. One might imagine a mirror
cultural image for the rich: more ashamed, not self-justifying ("I pro-
vided value, hence I got rich" might be a common American reflec-
tion-or "I was lucky"), and more interested in hiding the result.
20 David Woodruff and Almar Latour, Barnevik Gets Harsh Verdict in Court of Public
Opinion: FormerABB Chief Is Disgraced in Pension Plan, Wall St J Eur Al (Feb 18,2002). The
company was said to have sought to get much of that pension back, and Barnevik is said to have
agreed to return more than halt ABB: Percy Barnevik et Goeran Lindahl restituent une part de
leurs indemnits, Les Echos 18 (Mar 11, 2002).And although Bamevik had to resign from several
prestigious European board positions, id, he seemed likely to hold on to his American board seat
at General Motors. See Danny Hakim, G.M. Keeps Options Open on Director, NY Tunes C8
(Feb 19,2002).
21 Peter Goldstein, Managers & Managing: Compensation Packages Aren't All Alike-Base
Pay Converges in Europ4 but Bonuses and Stock Options Vary, Wall St J Eur 4 (Dec 22, 1998)
(emphasis added).
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These are not American-style sentiments here-or at least the
American sentiment, even if substantively similar, is much, much
paler. Surely these are not dominant American sentiments. Hence,
compensation can be constrained by culture (but isn't here). Even a
shareholder-oriented board would think twice about rewarding senior
managers if it would degrade the organization, de-motivate middle
management, or even induce work stoppages.
An American economics-oriented analyst might then think that
this imagined alternative culture, exemplified perhaps by the French
possibility," would be inefficient. And, true, inside that three-player
game, the three players in America would have fewer options to re-
equilibrate than they now do. But that does not necessarily make the
other cultures poorer, less efficient, or less fair. People's preferences
are paid attention to, and the resulting equilibrium might yield a dol-
lar or two less in GNP, as conventionally measured; but if the cultural
preference differs, aggregate utility would be higher there if structures
bend to the preference."
The key point is not that one society or another is better off, but
that culture would affect how the three-player contractarian corporate
model played out. The Coasean rebargain would not work the same
for them, in the alternative culture, as it works here and now, in Amer-
ica's real culture. And the Coasean "Nature of the Firm" organiza-
tional adjustment could dominate the Coasean "Social Cost" contrac-
tarian adjustment.
III. CAN CULTURE EVER AFFECT CORPORATE LAW AND
INTERESTED PARTY TRANSACTIONS?
Why stop there? Couldn't the apparent efficiency of corporate
law's core-constraining interested party transactions-be affected,
indeed determined, by this one single cultural constraint? Consider two
countries that constrain interested-party transactions well but imper-
fectly: most interested-party transactions do not get through. But,
Swiss-cheese-like, the institutions-primarily legal and judicial-
impede most but are not impermeable. More could get through if the
self-interested players persisted.
So posit that American law is pretty good overall on this score,
but-Swiss-cheese-like-has holes. And, of course we have one of the
economic model's basic insights in play here: The best corporate law
22 This French possibility is from a conversation a few years ago. If real then, it probably is
less real now for France, as compensation in more firms there creeps up toward American-style
pay. See Proxinvest, La rdmungration des dirigeants du CAC 40 5 (2001); Fay Sophie, Les patrons
frangais autantpay6s que lesAm~ricains, Le Monde (Feb 6,2002).
23 See generally Gary S. Becker and Kevin M. Murphy, Social Economics: Market Behavior
in a Social Environment (Belknap 2000).
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for shareholders does not constrain managers completely but does so
("only") optimally. Constraints have costs: Some worthwhile transac-
tions would be deterred if the constraints were too tight, and con-
straints have costs as the organization becomes more bureaucratic and
less supple. Hence, even a purely shareholder-oriented system would
have some bad transactions getting through the Swiss cheese now and
then. Enron might tell us that the holes in the Swiss cheese have be-
come too big in the United States,.2 but if the system self-corrects well
and does not over-correct, holes would persist because costs to perfec-
tion would persist.
Imagine then a country with a clone of American corporate law:
quite good but without purporting to constrain or succeeding in con-
straining all interested-party transactions. Some get through. But the
one difference is culture, and again we focus on only one cultural trait
and its potential effect on corporate structure. We stick with the same
difference we have been focusing on: the "outrage" constraint on ex-
ecutive compensation is much, much lower in this clone country. Di-
rectors cannot pay senior managers more than, say, a few hundred
thousand dollars per year in total compensation. "No one," one could
imagine the players in this alternative culture thinking, "is worth more
than $500,000 in annual pay."
Compare these two countries in managerial propensity to push
the firm into interested-party transactions. Managers have less to gain
from self-dealing transactions in a country like the United States be-
cause high executive compensation (whether of the rent-extraction or
the incentive variety) already makes them super-rich. But in a country
where the "outrage constraint" is much lower-where the rich are
hated, where culture is different, where the insider-managers have to
(a) hide their wealth, and (b) engineer opaque transactions to put
more money in their pockets-then the managers have a higher de-
mand to hide insider trades, to obscure related-party transactions via
corporate selling to a controlled entity, and to get more out of the firm
in high perqs (those company-paid benefits that can make their lives
comfortable).
Corporate law might be equally stable, efficacious, and so forth in
these two nations-the real United States and the culturally differing
clone-but there would be more "bad" (but mostly hidden) transac-
tions in the culture where the outrage constraint was lower. Or, stated
differently, we see an equal number of "bad" transactions in both cul-
tures. But in the cultures where the outrage-constraint is inconsequen-
24 See Jeffrey N. Gordon, What Enron Means for the Management and Control of the Mod-
em Business Corporation: Some Initial Reflections, 69 U Chi L Rev 1233,1249 (arguing that En-
ron's problems are "symptomatic of troubling if not egregious behavior elsewhere").
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tial (for example, the United States), we see these transactions in the
form of high CEO compensation. And in the outrage-constrained cul-
tures (think: France, Germany, Italy, Scandinavia), we see these trans-
actions in the form of corporate manipulations (insider trading, re-
lated party sales, and so forth).
This-the American result-may be the cheapest managerial
pursuit of self-interest. Once the manager is paid his or her expected
potential in diverting value away from outside shareholders, the man-
agers would not (in this model) engage in any more interested-party
transactions.
Why? Not necessarily because they think more money cannot be
had, but because of a diminishing marginal utility of money. After the,
say, $20 million in compensation is had, the manager is less interested
in the $2 million interested-party transaction. His sense of self-worth
would be demeaned in any case by having to stoop to engineer such a
deal, and with $20 million already in his bank account, the utility of
the transaction to the manager is lower. And with that Swiss-cheese
corporate law in place, the manager engineering that kind of a trans-
action puts the $20 million at risk in two ways: (1) he or she might get
caught and lose that good job (and the $20 million too), and (2) secret
interested-party transactions often distort the firm's operations. That
distortion can lower firm value and, if the $20 million comes in an eq-
uity interest (a stream of stock options, for example), the manager
who pursues a $2 million dollar interested-party transaction that de-
means firm value by more than 10 percent would not make money by
engineering the deal.
So he or she retreats from pushing the transaction. And overall,
that country might be thought to have better corporate law than the
one where the manager-paid a "mere" $500,000-goes ahead with
the insider trading or the interested-party transaction or the very high
perqs. But it is culture that is making the difference here, not the base-
line quality of corporate law or its enforcement. '
IV. CULTURAL ENDOGENEITY: How ECONOMICS
CONSTRAINS CULTURE
The world is surely more complicated than the three characteris-
tics we have focused on thus far: takeovers as the only constraint on
25 I am here working through one cultural constraint and its effect on when outrage at
managerial compensation kicks in. But one could work through a slew of such cultural con-
straints and see how they could affect corporate law and corporate structure. Not just: When
does outrage kick in? But also: When does managerial self-restraint kick in? Why and when do
players act professionally? Why and when do they act in a self-interested fashion? Or, how does
one build "unit cohesion" both at the top and throughout the organization, loyalty beyond that
which law requires?
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managers; compensation as the only way of making takeovers work;
and cultural attitudes toward wealth as the only constraint on com-
pensation.
One complexity is endogeneity. Cultures are a mix of traits: envy
and jealousy; admiration for and resentment of those who succeed; re-
spect for wealth and hatred of the rich, and so on. Mechanisms that
succeed economically can reinforce the supporting cultural traits and
suppress those that hinder the successful mechanisms.
So culture could change as corporate structures change, and there
is evidence that this has been happening in Europe.n But endogeneity
has its own limits. Some cultural traits are so embedded that they do
not change. Those that would be most susceptible to change are those
that are only implicated by one new modem institution. But if the trait
fits many institutions, only one of which is changing and only one of
which is impeded by the constraint, that constraint will tend to endure
more than the constraint that is only implicated by one changing insti-
tution. In a sense, cultural traits can be part of networks, and if only
one part of the network is pressing on the constraint economically,
while the others do not press (or in fact support) it, then the trait can
and will persist.
V. POLITICALAND SOCIAL LIMITS?
Managers and shareholders have been at odds in takeover con-
tests. The rules of the game now favor managers, with takeover rules
coming close now to the "just say no" defense that managers and their
lawyers have long favored." Economically oriented analysis usually
sees this as inefficient or-even in a friendly analysis of the pill, such
as Kahan and Rock's-efficient but only after players adjust and re-
equilibrate (with higher managerial compensation inducing protected
managers to accept takeover bids).
As such, the economic model in its positive form needs to explain
the usual antitakeover results. Here, for a brief moment, I will trace
what might be a plausible economic story, sketching a possible basis
for this antitakeover result to be efficient (or at least not wildly costly)
in that three-player bargain. Then I shall return to our search for
boundaries to the economic model.
The economic model might try to explain antitakeover results
with an implicit contracts perspective. That is, one might imagine that
stockholders would want to give managers discretion and authority,
26 See, for example, Proxinvest, La RNmungration des Dirigeants du CAC 40 at 5 (cited in
note 22) (concluding that executive pay in France is approaching that in the United States).
27 See Martin Lipton, Pills; Polls and Professors Redux, 69 U Chi L Rev 1037 (2002) (argu-
ing that, to be effective in negotiations, boards need to have the power to resist a takeover).
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that they would believe that managers would work best if given free
rein. One could certainly imagine employment systems that did so
(academic tenure comes to mind). And the new literature on IPO
charter terms might support a yet-to-be developed implicit contract
theory. That is, the new IPO charter literature shows that despite the
presence of dominant stockholders, the newly public firms use anti-
takeover terms in the charters, terms that the dominant stockholders
have the means and, as usually thought, the incentives to eliminate.-
While an agency cost failure could explain this result,2 it is at least
possible that there is some efficiency effect that has yet to be well un-
derstood, probably one in which autonomy yields better (or at least
equal) results.
Let us put aside the potential efficiency story for takeover protec-
tion-one that is not yet convincing to us, because most of the benefits
seem available by other, cheaper means. Let us look at how other
boundaries limit the three-party bargain.
Managers usually win in making takeover law. Their positional
advantage in the firm gives them leverage on how firms throw their
weight around in the political arena. The mechanism is similar to how
Victor Brudney and Allen Ferrell argue corporate charitable contribu-
tions represent managerial goals, not shareholder goals.30 One can and
should see managers' takeover wins as partly due to their positional
advantage in the firm being writ large into the polity. Corporate gov-
ernance conflicts inside the firm-between managers and the board
on one hand and shareholders on the other-can spill over into the
polity. And who wins can depend on authority inside the firm and how
alliances play out in the polity.
Once those internal conflicts spill over, agency costs could be pro-
jected onto the polity, as managers try to use corporate resources to
pay for political influence. True, that kind of direct influence has long
been illegal, and managers' use of corporate resources must be more
indirect.'
28 See Laura Casares Field and Jonathan M. Karpoff Takeover Defenses at IPO Firms, 57 J
Fin (forthcoming 2002) (finding that 53 percent of industrial firms going public from 1988 to
1992 employed at least one takeover defense at the time of their IPO); Robert Daines and Mi-
chael Klausner, Do IPO Charters Maximize Firm Value?: Antitakeover Protection in IPOs, 17 J L,
Econ, & Org 83, 110 (2001) (finding that nearly 50 percent of firms going public adopt strong an-
titakeover provisions); John C. Coates IV, Explaining Variation in Takeover Defenses: Blame the
Lawyers, 89 Cal L Rev 1301 (2001).
29 Field and Karpoff Takeover Defenses at IPO Firms at 30 (cited in note 28) (pointing out
that the separation of ownership and management is present at the IPO stage between manager
and non-manager shareholders).
30 See Brudney and Ferrell, 69 U Chi L Rev at 1199 (cited in note 5).
31 See Robert H. Sitkoff, Corporate Political Speech and the Competition for Corporate
Charters, 69 U Chi L Rev 1103 (2002).
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But the polity can still determine some division of the spoils. This
too places a limit on the economic model of corporate law. Antitake-
over law was that much easier for managers to get in Ohio, Illinois, and
Pennsylvania because players outside the three-party bargain-labor
and "innocent" bystanders-were skeptical of takeovers. Incumbent
labor, after all, has votes: it gave legislatures both a reason to favor an-
titakeover rules and a reason to hesitate when considering whether to
overturn judge-made antitakeover rules. (Incumbent employees have
votes, and since takeover law has to survive in the political arena be-
fore it gets to the economic arena, takeover law is less pro-shareholder
than it would be otherwise.) These Ohio, Illinois, and Pennsylvania re-
sults left "space" for Delaware to go where it wanted to go.'
The judges' article in this Symposium introduces another politi-
cal/social element in Delaware into the equation, one that reaches the
antitakeover result more directly, and one that goes outside the three-
player economic model. Chancellor William Allen and Vice Chancel-
lors Jack Jacobs and Leo Strine" tell us that in the back of the Dela-
ware judges' minds sometimes are stakeholder interests, interests that
cannot be-or should not be-slighted. Could this be tracing out one
more boundary for the pure economic model? In one form, it could be
this: There are differing allocations of authority among the three eco-
nomic players at the top: more board authority in one,4 less in an-
other." But unless one model or another is convincing to the chancel-
lors, maybe convincing beyond all reasonable doubt, other considera-
tions come into play, such as the chancellors' sympathy for the employ-
ees at the target (or at least at some targets). And hence corporate law
is made with considerations beyond the economic coming into play,
considerations that tip the balance between one economic model and
another. And hence, we have one more boundary to the economic
model of the public firm.
32 It is not obvious that if one wanted to bring employees/stakeholders to the table, the
best way to do it would be to give managers more discretion, with that discretion reviewable
primarily by the Chancery Court. Neither the managers nor the judges are primarily attuned to
stakeholder interests. Hence, a political claim would be of an implicit "deal": incumbent employ-
ees could not get what they would want (job protection?), but could only get an implicit alliance
with managers to slow down the takeover machine. Or, more cynically, managers had to adopt an
employee-oriented rhetoric to stabilize antitakeover law in a way that benefited themselves.
33 The first is emeritus, the second two sitting.
34 See Lipton, 69 U Chi L Rev 1037 (cited in note 27) (arguing that boards need strong de-
fensive powers to be strong negotiators for target shareholders).
35 See Bebchuk, 69 U Chi L Rev 973 (cited in note 5) (arguing that for target shareholders
it is undesirable for boards to have a veto over outside offers to buy those shares).
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CONCLUSION: GLIMPSES OF BOUNDARIES TO THE ECONOMIC MODEL
OF THE CORPORATION
The economic model works well in explaining American corpo-
rate law and American corporate structures. It explains well much that
we see because cultural constraints that could kick in early do not.
Explaining this or that feature by pointing to culture without
specification generally is too easy. To get a better handle than we have
so far on how culture can affect corporate law, law's efficacy, or the
corporate structures that we do see, we should begin small, or at least
narrowly, and examine how one specific cultural constraint can affect
the microstructure of corporate governance in the firm.
The Articles give us one possibility: the "outrage" that is said to
constrain executive pay from going even higher. If the internal outrage
constraint to executive pay were low, not high (that is, if the constraint
were not as weak as it is in the United States), the boundary for the
economic model would be drawn differently. The Coasean bargain that
keeps takeovers going in the face of hostile laws, structures, and court
decisions would be less easily reversed, or not reversed at all. Take-
overs would be less frequent. If other tools of making managers loyal
to shareholders were much more imperfect, then performance of the
large public firm would degrade, and presumably ownership structures
would change: There would be a comparative advantage for closely-
held corporations over public firms. Firms would be smaller and more
closely held, with denser relational contracts among them. The adjust-
ment would be more akin to the Coasean firm-versus-market adjust-
ment of The Nature of the Firm than the internal contractarian adjust-
ment of The Problem of Social Cost.
More could be said about how varying just this single cultural con-
straint could affect corporate results. Corporate law could be the same
in two nations, but cultural differences could determine how managers
extract rents (visibly via excess compensation or veiled via interested
party transactions). If managerial compensation is very high, managers
could rationally decline to pursue interested party transactions that
they have a high chance of "getting away with." But if culture con-
strained compensation, then managers' "demand" for these transac-
tions could be higher.
And that is just culture. Think about the Coasean possibility that
several allocations of authority among shareholders, managers, and
boards are (roughly) equally efficient. Most of the time, the three
players decide what to do. But when they dispute results, they usually
turn to other authorities to resolve their disputes-the judges or the
legislators who can invoke principles and sentiments outside of the
three-player bargain. Voters' skepticism about takeovers has been
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noted before, as has legislators' susceptibility to labor influence.37 The
articles in this Symposium tell us even more: The simple sympathy of
the chancellors for the employees can influence some results, pre-
sumably when the direction that other considerations point to is un-
certain, unclear, or moot.
And hence, out in the haze of the corporate horizon, we can catch
glimmers of boundaries to the economic model of the firm.
36 See Roberta Romano, The Future of Hostile Takeovers: Legislation and Public Opinion,
57 U Cin L Rev 457, 491 (1998) (noting that a plurality of the public "has a negative opinion of
takeovers").
37 See Mark J. Roe, Takeover Politics, in Margaret M. Blair, ed, The Deal Decade: What
Takeovers and Leveraged Buyouts Mean for Corporate Governance 321, 339-40 (Brookings
1993).
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